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Liquid Pump-fed Main Engines
•  Pump-fed liquid engines are one of  the most complex and challenging 
subsystems on the entire launch vehicle and present many systems 
engineering challenges 
•  Pump-fed liquid engine design requires many of the same design functions 
and analysis disciplines that the vehicle design uses, but  
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•  Liquid rocket engines have much higher
 power densities than more conventional
 transportation system engines 
•  This creates extreme environments and
 stretches the limits of design and analysis
 capabilities 
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•  Turbopumps differ from conventional gas turbine engines in significant ways 
Item 
Typical Pump Fed Rocket Engine Hydrogen 
Turbopump Parameters (range depends on 
engine cycle and application) 
Jet Engine 
Fuel Hydrogen Petroleum distillate 
Oxidizer Oxygen Air 
Operating speed (RPM) 20,000 to 36,000 15,000 
Turbine blade tip speed (ft/sec) 1400 to 1850 1850 
Turbine power density (HP/in^2) 2000 to 3200 394 
Turbine inlet temperature (deg F) 1000 to 1600 2400 
Turbine heat transfer coef. (BTU/
ft^2- hr-degF) 20,000 to 54,000 500 
Turbine thermal start/stop transients 
(deg F/sec) 1000 to 32,000 100 
Pump/compressor pressure rise (psi) 2000 to 7000 400 - 600 
Pump dynamic pressure (psi) 500 to 2000 50 - 200 
Difficulty and Complexity of Liquid Rocket 
Engines Are Reflected in Turbomachinery Design
Difficult Propellants 
Material compatibility 
issues, cavitation, bearing 
stresses, high heat fluxes, 
 heavier flanges, tighter 
complex seals 
High Speeds 
     Bearing life,
 rotordynamics issues 
High Power Density 
High power bending
 stress, high work per unit
 area, tight manufacturing 
 tolerances 
Uncooled Blades 
Limit inlet temperature,
 increase rotational
 speed and blade
 turning 
High Thermal Strains 
Very high thermal stress,
 low cycle fatigue,
 material limitations 
High Pressures 
(static and dynamic) 
High housing loads,
 instabilities, high-cycle
 fatigue 
Extreme Blade Loading 
 Up to 550 hp per blade 
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Requirements, Technology Capability and Design
 Must Balance Early in Development Cycle
•  Strong tendency to view systems engineering as the processes
 that bring the designed parts together (integration) rather than
 creating “Integrated Designs” 
–  Based on the assumption that you can break the system apart
 assuming linearity and handle everything by defining pertinent
 requirements, defining and managing interfaces, design data flow,
 then designing the parts  
•  When the system is put back together it will perform ok.  
–  This is a false assumption because there are many nonlinear
 interactions in a complex “system” causing the parts to perform
 different together than apart. 
–  It also assumes design development is serial and not iterative in
 nature 
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Requirements, Technology Capability and Design
 Must Balance Early in Development Cycle
•  Rather, the systems engineer for an integrated design is
 responsible for and concerned with getting all interacting
 disciplines into a balanced state using uncertainties, sensitivities,
 risks, and programmatics (cost and schedule)  
–  Part of that task is to also insure that all the discipline models,
 simulations, technology base, etc are at the appropriate maturity level
 so that an accurate trade space can be determined 
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SSME Weight Story is a good example of what can go wrong if
 the requirements, technology base and final systems design do
 not balance early 
SSME Weight Growth History
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Customer addition of pogo  
suppression system. 
Customer addition of nozzle thermal protection. 
Thrust Requirement up to 550K. 
Weight previously scaled from 415K engine. 
Due to re-evaluation, weight increase is not as large. 
Lowering of thrust requirement  
to 470K. Authority to proceed. 
Customer requirements change. 
Machining of excess material. 
Stress analysis on primary nozzle resulted in weight increase and subsequent nozzle redesign. 
Customer change to heat shield  
increased nozzle structure. 
 Increase in nozzle  
tube walls to meet CEI  
safety factor. 
Change in bookkeeping  
philosophy. 
Actual weight variance deduction  
due to actual engine weights.  
Return to Flight Configuration 
Block I Configuration 
Block IIA Configuration Block II Configuration 
Challenge and Problem better understood by looking at engine thrust to weight ratio 6
SSME Vacuum Thrust to Weight Ratio History
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First Flight 
Customer addition of nozzle thermal protection. 
Thrust Requirement up to 550K. 
Lowering of thrust requirement  
to 470K.Authority to proceed. 
Customer requirements change. 
Machining of excess material. 
Stress analysis on primary nozzle resulted in weight increase and subsequent nozzle redesign. 
Customer change to heat shield increased nozzle structure. 
Increase in nozzle  
tube walls to meet CEI  
safety factor. 
Change in bookkeeping  
philosophy. 
Actual weight variance deduction  
due to actual engine weights.  
Return to Flight Configuration 
Block I Configuration 
Block IIA Configuration 
Block II Configuration 
Thrust increase from 470k  
to 490k without weight  
increase 
•  Early (1971) thrust to weight ratio predictions for the 
SSME concepts were around 65 to 1 
–  Based on J-2 and F-1 technology base and some 
advanced development with Air Force  
–  Estimate was realistic and representative of 
achievable values 
•  As the Space Shuttle System design concept 
matur d, weight became a serious problem driving 
the thrust to weight ratio requirements of the SSME 
to 80 to 1 
–  The technology base did not support this requirement 
–  Massive development effort required to cut weight out 
of the engine 
•  All welded construction for most of the components 
•  No weld lands 
•  Machining off all excess material 
–  Additional performance enhancements to meet system 
weight problem included trading engine life for 
increased power level  
•  Increased engine thrust to 109% PL and cut design 
life from 100 to 55 missions 
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SSME Weight Problems
•  As consequence of weight cuts and power level increase, engine
 began experiencing many fatigue failures some resulting in
 catastrophic engine failures during ground testing 
–  High cost of hardware losses, design changes and schedule slips 
–  In 1978, two alternating MSFC engineering teams of about 100 each
 were established at Canoga Park and worked with a large team at
 MSFC for 9 months to address these problems  
–  Instituted a fracture control survey of engine and identified many
 problem areas 
•  Engine originally not designed for fracture control 
•  Fracture control team established permanently 
•  Lack of robustness in design lead to increased operations costs to
 assure engine safety and reliability  
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SSME Solutions and Weight Growth
•  In late 70’s as Shuttle System design began to solidify, weight was
 offered up to the SSME project manager to fix problems by Shuttle
 program manager 
–  SSME project manager put off weight increases to support first flight
 date using current engine design with limited life and performance 
•  Believed that it was better to be flying at lower capability than to wait
 until all capability was available (balancing political concerns) 
–  Weight was increased as new redesigned components were added as
 block upgrades beginning in the mid to late 80’s and into the 90’s 
•  Major examples are Two Duct Hot Gas Manifold, Large Throat Main
 Combustion Chamber, ATD High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump,
 ATD High Pressure Fuel Turbopump 
•  Weight could be added without impacting performance because the
 Orbiter had to fly ballast in the back to offset a heavy nose section 
–  Increased engine weight just off loaded ballast 
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•  Final engine T/W ratio essentially same as originally estimated but
 final design was compromised because unrealistic requirements
 set stage for constrained engine design 
SSME Vacuum Thrust to Weight Ratio History
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First Flight 
Customer addition of nozzle thermal protection. 
Thrust Requirement up to 550K. 
Lowering of thrust requirement  
to 470K.Authority to proceed. 
Customer requirements change. 
Machining of excess material. 
Stress analysis on primary nozzle resulted in weight increase and subsequent nozzle redesign. 
Customer change to heat shield increased nozzle structure. 
Increase in nozzle  
tube walls to meet CEI  
safety factor. 
Change in bookkeeping  
philosophy. 
Actual weight variance deduction  
due to actual engine weights.  
Return to Flight Configuration 
Block I Configuration 
Block IIA Configuration 
Block II Configuration 
Thrust increase from 470k  
to 490k without weight  
increase 
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Lesson Learned
•  Absolutely critical that someone be responsible for the Integrated Vehicle 
System Design (not just “integrating” pieces together) to adequately 
balance the risks across all elements while decomposing the 
requirements down to each element taking into account the varying 
maturity levels of the technology base, the design of each and the 
intricate interactions 
–  Shuttle system was designed with an immature technology base for many of 
the subsystems 
–  Made it impossible to adequately balance risk by properly flowing down 
requirements to these subsystems such as the SSME 
–  Cannot adequately measure risk if technology base is not understood 
•  Pushing the envelope without margin or a robust design will result in 
increased problems and non-optimum designs at significant cost 
–  SSME, while a magnificent machine, is not robust 
–  It took numerous design block changes with increased weight and 
operations costs to reach the current level of maturity that is flying today  
•  Anticipating unknowns is essential because they will occur during 
development 
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